The Haqqani Network: Terrorists or Insurgents

The definition of terrorism is broad and open to interpretation. Hoffman, in his book Inside Terrorism, suggests that terrorism is the deliberate reality and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. Schwartz, Dunkel, et al, define terrorism in their Studies in struggle & Terrorism article entitled Terrorism An identity element Theory Perspective, as the deliberate targeting of civilian sites for attacks designed to result in destruction of those sites and/or the injury and death of noncombatant civilians. Together, these two perspectives coupled with identity theory and will serve as the basis for an evaluation of the Haqqani net profit and their interrelationships and interactions with known terrorist groups such(prenominal) as the Taliban and al-Qaida as well as with Pakistans military and government intelligence agencies.The Haqqani Network Who Are They and Why do We Care? The Haqqani interlocking is an afghan and Pakistani group of fighters that operates primarily in s popheastern Afghanistan as a semi-autonomous comp mavinnt of the Taliban with close ties to Pakistans Army and intelligence agencies (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. -2). The Haqqani networks lead structure is hierarchical in nature with members of the patriarchs family filling top leadership roles (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. 7). This familial structure is an important cultural identity bell ringer that can serve to promote terrorist activities. Further much, Schwartz, Dunkel, et al address the family as it relates to upholding honor and avenging wrongs done to the family. This is interesting because even those who sympathize and support terrorism, but dont actually participate in it, often share the same level of social identity based upon their group affiliations.This tends to show how the Haqqani network is able to conserve its influence over their colleague groups without actually having to be in control of th em. It appears to be a symbiotic relationship where the Haqqani network clearly benefits from bi-directional believability of friendship with the Taliban and al-Qaida. Rassler et al support this claim when they discuss the relationship between senior Haqqani network leaders and their close operational relationships with the Taliban and al-Qaida, revealing that there is often no distinction.This shared identity-based connection legitimizes the Haqqani network with the segment of the Afghan society that believes in radical Islam and jihad. This was evidenced when the Haqqani network helped sustain al-Qaidas relevance and branding as the leader of the global jihadist movement. All in all, it appears the Haqqani network just wants their proverbial place at the table so to speak. Clearly, it must be working, as live assessments couch the strength of the group close to 15,000 fighters. The Haqqani Network Duplicity at WorkAmerican intelligence and military officials claim the Haqqani network is a proxy force apply by the Pakistani intelligence service Pakistans Inter-Service Intelligence ISI agency to carry out grisly, high-profile attacks. The question here is whether this is a relationship of convenience or an league due to shared identity. The secret relationship with ISI coupled with links to al-Qaida and the Taliban clearly shows the need to solicit support (e. g. , material, financial, spiritual, etc. ) and ultimately rally the masses throne them.Furthermore, for decades, the Haqqani network has been a mentor to Arab, Uzbek, Chechen, Turkish, and Pakistani jihadists. These associations speak to the core of shared identity and the interactions among the groups, as according to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al social and cultural identity is organise when members come together based upon common beliefs shared across the group, and individual identity represents personally chosen goals, values, and beliefs coupled with their perspectives of the world around the m.The study of terrorism necessitates (according to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al) that we not only understand the effects of identity, but also the interactions among these levels. In addition, we need to look at the importance of the wider community as Schwartz, Dunkel, et al put it, Without local, and sometimes international support, those engaged in terrorist attacks would find it substantially more difficult, if not impossible, to conduct their activities. Working with the Taliban, al-Qaida, and Pakistans ISI is a duplicitous role that provides credibility within, and across, multiple dimensions of jihad (Rassler et al.July 14, 2011, p. 5) establishing the shared identity necessary to imbue respect and connectivity as part of an influential group dynamic. Why is all this important? The Haqqani networks credibility in the region, especially with the tribal groups of Afghanistan, helps extend the Talibans reach and because the Haqqani network is effective militarily, they act as a for ce multiplier for the Taliban. This puts the Haqqani network in a regional leadership position, and Schwartz, Dunkel, et al suggest that this leadership role would be considered admirable providing further social capital.The Haqqani Network Terrorist holy terror or Insurgency? So with such a significant fighting force that is radicalized, is the Haqqani network a terrorist organization pitted against Western ideology, or is it scarce an insurgency focused on eradicating outsiders who have forced their way into the Afghani homeland? According to the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Department of State as of September 15, 2011, the Haqqani network is not listed as a foreign terrorist organization. Despite this, according to the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, The U.S. military has long been frustrated by deadly operations carried out against its troops in Afghanistan by Haqqani Network forces. They quote U. S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta as saying, W e cannot have the Haqqanis coming across the border attacking our forces and Afghans and disappearing tush into a safe haven in Pakistan. In between the rhetoric, the real reason they arent on the terrorist list is because there is a belief that, such a move would scuttle any chances that the group might make peace with Afghanistans government. To make our decision, it is essential that we not lose sight of the need to sanely evaluate this group from the point of view of that group and not from the Westernized framework we can easily apply to it. Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, point out that, Scholars insistence that terrorists are in some way not like us but, instead, abnormalinsane, power hungry, or a combination of bothis a classic exercise in out-group stereotypingwhich undermines the analytical benefit of the interpretations in use. Applying this to the Haqqani network and to prevent us from being constrained by our (Western) cultural boundaries, it is incumbent upon us t o look at the Haqqani network from their vantage point. The clearest and most-recent pass came in September of 2011 when Sirajuddin Haqqani (the son of the groups patriarch, Jalaluddin Haqqani) told The Telegraph in the United Kingdom via a telephone interview, There are sincere spate in the Afghan government who are loyal to the Taliban as they know our goal is the liberation of our homeland from the clutches of occupying forces. With this, their actions, and their relationships, it is apparent that the Haqqani network is interested more in the local issues and having local influence than it is in trying to wage a global jihad against the West. A such, their lack of inclusion from the list of terrorist organizations is even-tempered valid. Bibliography Brannan, David W. , Esler, Philip F. , and Strindberg, N. T. Anders. 2001. Talking to Terrorists Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism. Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 24, no. 1 3-24. Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, About the Haqqani network. outlast special September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http//news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqani-network Griffin, Emory. A First Look at Communication Theory. New York The McGraw-Hill Companies, 1997. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York Columbia University Press, 2006. Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, Brutal Haqqani offensive Clan Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. function modify September 24, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2011. http//www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. hypertext mark-up language? pagewanted=all.Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 11, 2011. www. ctc. usma. edu. Shahzad, Faizul. Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relatio nship. Terrorism Monitor. 9. no. 37 (2011) 1-2. http//www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November 10, 2011). Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 540. Websites Referenced http//www. cfr. org http//www. tc. usma. edu http//www. dawn. com http//www. foreignaffairs. com http//www. jamestown. org http//news. nationalpost. com http//www. nytimes. com/ http//www. state. gov http//www. telegraph. co. uk http//www. thedailybeast. com http//tribune. com. pk http//www. understandingwar. org/themenode/haqqani-network 1 . Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY Columbia University Press. p. 40. 2 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 537-559. 3 . Ibid (p. 540)Identity theory for our purposes will blot out cultural identity, so cial identity, and personal identity. 4 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. 5 . The Haqqani networks patriarch and leader is Jalaluddin Haqqani, although it is reported that he may be in ill health, and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is running the day-to-day operations. http//www. cfr. org/afghanistan/institute-study-war-haqqani-network/p26126 6 .Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 542. 7 . Ibid. 8 . Ibid (p. 548) 9 . Much like the traditional phrase, guilt by association, I suggest there could be credibility by association. It is concept that is often discussed in marketing whereby a person, product, or company gains credibility by associating itself with a larger more recognized person, product, or compa ny (e. g. , a computer with the Intel Inside sticker on it). 10 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown.The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 40) 11 . Ibid (p. 43). 12 . http//tribune. com. pk/story/259314/sirajuddin-haqqani-dares-us-to-attack-n-waziristan/ 13 . Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, Brutal Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. Last modified September 24, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2011. http//www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. html? pagewanted=all. 14 .Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY Columbia University Press. p. 199. 15 . Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, About the Haqqani network. Last modified September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http//news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqan i-network 16 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 540. 17 . Ibid. 18 . Ibid (p. 548) 19 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 13) 20 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 550. 21 . The current list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations contains 49 entries, but the Haqqani Network is not one of them. http//www. state. gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085. htm 22 . Faizul Shahzad, Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship, Terrorism Monitor, 9, no. 37 (2011) 1-2, http//www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November